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1. INTRODUCTION 
In most of the South and Southeast Asia, and in much of the Sub­
Sahara Africa, agriculture is dominated by smallholders, who derive 
their livelihoods by cultivating small pieces of land and 
supplementing their incomes with dairy, poultry or fish farming. And, 
the number of such small-sized holdings has been steadily increasing 
under the growing population pressure. For instance, in India, the 
share of smallholdings « 2 ha) has increased from 70 per cent in 
1971 to 80 per cent in 1995 (Gol, 2003) ; it is expected to reach 83 
per cent by 2010 aha, 2001) . In such a scenario, the fundamental 
issues that need to be looked into are: Can smallholders meet their 
food security and other basic needs by cultivating low-value 
commodities? Does the existing dominance of subsistence farming 
have some opportunities to bring them out of the low-income trap? 
Do smallholders have better income augmenting opportunities in 
high-value agriculture emanating from the unfolding process of 
rising income levels and growing urbanisation, market liberalisation 
and globalisation? If opportunities for smallholders do exist, what 
kind of policy interventions and institutional arrangements need to 
be put in place to enable them to derive maximum benefit from 
them? 
Earlier evidence indicates that such opportunities do exist for 
smallholders in the high-value food segment (Barghouti et aI., 2003; 
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Pingali and Rosegrant, 1995; von Braun, 1995) . Sustained growth in 
per capita income and increasing urban population have aided the 
rapid growth in -demand for high-value foods in the developing 
countries (Delgado et a/., 1999; Kumar et a/., 2003) . At the same time, 
global demand for high-value food has been rising with growing 
exports from the developing countries (Diaz-Bonilla and Recca, 2000) . 
On the supply side, the smallholders have abundant resource of 
labour, which is  one of the key characteristics of high-value 
agriculture Qoshi et aI., 2003) . This offers a unique opportunity to 
smallholders in utilising their family labour more efficiently in high­
value agriculture and attaining high labour productivity and incomes. 
In the Indian context, it has been found that demand for and 
supply of high-value food commodities have grown much faster than 
that for foodgrains (Kumar et al., 2003; Joshi et ai., 2003) . The share 
of high-value commodities in gross value of agricultural output has 
impressively increased from 26  per cent in 1981-82 to 37 per cent 
in 1997-98 Qoshi et ai., 2003) . A question is often posed whether the 
smallholders would be able to participate in such a fast changing 
commercial agriculture and share the benefits of  unfolding 
opportunities. There are strong apprehensions that smallholders may 
be at the losers' end on marketing front (Glover and Kusterer, 1990) . 
High-value commodities are often perishable in nature and generally 
feed the local markets that are usually thin and fragmented. 
Marketable surplus of an individual producer is too small to be 
bargained and traded remuneratively in distant markets due to high 
marketing and transaction costs (Delgado, 1999;  Escobal et ai., 2000) . 
It has to be remembered that some components of transaction costs 
are fixed in nature on a per-transaction basis rather than being 
proportional to the quantity and value of sales.  Beside these 
problems, the prices of high-value food commodities are highly 
volatile. Even a small increase in supply can lead to a sharp decline 
in their prices. All these factors escalate the transaction costs and 
increase risks in production and marketing considerably that may be 
devastating for smallholders. 
The key issue that needs to be addressed is that how smallholders 
can switch to high-value food commodities with minimum 
transaction costs and market risks. Experiences gained in developed 
countries and also in many developing countries in Southeast Asia, 
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Africa and Latin America have revealed that various forms of 
institutions, such as cooperatives, producers' associations and contract 
farming, have the potential to reduce transaction costs by vertically 
coordinating] production, marketing and processing (Warning and 
Key, 2000; Narayanan and Gulati, 2002) . In the Indian context, 
vertical coordination is a recent phenomenon in high-value and 
perishable commodities with the exception of milk, through 
cooperatives. It is encouraging to note that such innovative 
institutions are gradually emergin g in niche areas and are 
successfully coordinating with the farmers in production and 
marketing of high-value food commodities (Asokan and Singh, 
2003) . These institutions have attracted a lot of attention, and 
already professional debates have taken place on their role in the 
distribution of benefits, particularly to smallholders. 
It is important to understand how firms coordinate with the 
farmers and what their implications are to smallholders. Attempt 
should be made to understand the modus operandi adopted by such 
institutions and study its effect on smallholders with a view to 
introducing policy changes to improve efficiency and equity of the 
system. The present chapter is an attempt in that direction. To be 
more precise, it intends to investigate such issues as: ( i) What 
processes that are adopted by different business houses in linking 
production and marketing of high-value food commodities? (ii) What 
is their effect on transaction costs and farm profitability, especially 
from the point of view of smallholders? and ( iii) What are the 
various policy options that can be arrived at for strengthening 
vertical linkages between smallholders and the business houses? Our 
, 
hypothesis is that 'the vertical coordination in high-value food 
segment helps in lowering the transaction costs and market risks of 
smallholders' . 
To test the hypothesis, we chose three important and the most 
perishable high-value commodities in India, viz. milk, broilers and 
vegetables. It may be mentioned that India is one of the largest 
producers of these commodities.  In 200 1 ,  India ranked first in 
production of milk (82 million tonnes) and fruits (49 million 
1. Vertical coordination refers to the synchronisation of successive stages of 
production and marketing with respect to quantity, quality and timing of product 
flows (Martinez, 2002). Vertical coordmation includes open production (open or 
spot market), contract production and vertical integration. 
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tonnes) (FAO, 2002) ; second in vegetables2 (68 million tonnes) ; and 
sixth in broiler production (1 .4 million tonnes) (Landes et aI., 2004) . 
Unfortunately, these commodities are prone to high post-harvest 
losses and value-addition is woefully lacking in India. Only about 
two per cent of the production of fruits and vegetables, 15 per cent 
of milk, and one per cent out of the total of 4.5 million tonnes of 
meat are processed at commercial scale (Gol, 2002) . It is, therefore, 
essential that post-harvest losses are minimised and value-addition is 
increased through strengthening of farm-firm linkages. 
This chapter consists of six sections. A brief introdu<;:tion is 
followed by a theoretical backdrop on the relationship between 
vertical coordination and transaction costs, and methodology adopted 
for estimation of transaction costs. The implications of vertical 
coordination on transaction costs and farm profitability are 
presented in section 3. In section 4 the factors  that influence 
producers' participation in the emerging institutions have been 
examined. Policy impediments in replicating the successful models of 
vertical coordination are given in section 5. And, in the last section, 
policy changes have been recommended to strengthen farm-firm 
linkages with a view to benefiting the smallholders. 
2. METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
Transaction Costs 
Transaction costs are the costs incurred by trading partners 
associated with the exchange of goods and services. These include 
costs involved in collection of market information, negotiations, 
monitoring and enforcement of business transaction Qaffee and 
Morton, 1995) . In a perfectly competitive situation, institutions with 
the lowest production and transaction costs for a given activity will 
have an edge over others and dominate the market (Coase, 19 60; 
\ 
Williamson, 1 9 79 and 2001) . The major factors influencing 
transaction costs and thereby the type of institution include asset­
specificity, uncertainty, and externality. The mQre specialised is the 
asset, the higher is the cost of its transferring to the next best use. 
Uncertainty influences the costs of searching information, screening, 
2. Th,s does not include tuber vegetables. 
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negotiation, bargaining and monitoring. Higher the uncertainty, the 
higher is the cost of renegotiating the contract. The externality 
principle states that a firm will move from spot markets to vertical 
coordination if the participants in the adjacent markets impose 
deliberate or unintended negative externalities. In spot markets, 
producers are free to produce and sell any amount of any commodity 
and buyers are free to purchase any quantity from any seller. In 
contrast, full integration prevails in a situation of high asset­
specificity and externality, and low uncertainty. The firm has 
complete control over production, marketing, processing and 
distribution. The intermediate institutional structures are 
cooperatives, producers' associations, contract farming, etc. with a 
number of variants (Eaton and Shepherd, 2001). 
Analytical Approach 
Theoretical developments in transaction cost economics have 
been accompanied by very little empirical analy sis 'due to 
measurement problems. De Janvry et al., (1991) and Williamson 
(1993) have suggested that the difference between selling and buying 
prices could serve as an approximation of the transaction costs. Some 
researchers have treated transportation costs (Fafchamps, 1992; 
Omamo, 1998) and the distance of sale point from the production 
site as proxies for transaction costs (Holloway et al., 2000). Some of 
the authors have classified transaction costs into tangible 
(transportation costs, communication costs, legal costs, etc.) and 
intangible (uncertainty, moral hazards, etc.) costs and have used 
proxies for these in the analysis of choice of markets (Hobbs, 1997; 
Escobal, 1999 and Holloway et al., 2000). 
This study has attempted to quantify tangible transaction costs 
incurred by the producers. Thus costs of travel, communication, 
transport and storage, loss in quality and quantity during 
transportation, credit, extension services, market fee, commission 
charges, and personnel time (own .and hired) have been included. 
Except for the costs of own personnel time (human labour), all 
other costs are the pecuniary costs. For the purpose of costing, own 
personnel time was evaluated at the existing market wages and was 
categorised as non-pecuniary component of transaction costs. Benefits 
to the producers were estimated in terms of changes in the 
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production and transaction costs due to institutional arrangements. 
Net profit was computed as the difference between the realised prices 
and the unit cost of production, including transaction costs. 
Data 
Primary field surveys of contract and non-contract producers of 
milk, broilers and vegetables were conducted to gather information 
on their production and transaction costs. One firm for each of these 
commodities was identified to select the contract producers for the 
survey. These included NestJe--Irulia-Limited-a multinational firm for 
milk and milk products, Venkateshwara Hatcheries Limited (VHL)­
a private sector dom�stic firm engaged in contract broiler farming, 
and Mother Dairy Fruits and Vegetables Limited (MDFVL)-a wholly 
owned subsidiary of public sector entity (namely, National Dairy 
Development Board), which sources fruits and vegetables through 
producers' associations. 
The survey for the three case studies was undertaken in the year 
2002-03 to collect the required information for the year 2001-02. 
The sample producers were interviewed to collect the required data, 
using pre-tested questionnaires, specifically prepared for each case 
study. Data from vegetable and milk producers was based on their 
memory and for broilers, the recall was supplemented with the 
records maintained by both contract and non-contract producers. 
Detailed information was collected about the socia-economic 
characteristics of the sample farmers, production-portfolio, item-wise 
and cycle-wise (in case of broilers) cost of production, yield levels, 
labour use, and cost of marketing and acquiring information for 
various activities. Information was also collected about marketing 
processes and item-wise cost of acquiring inputs and marketing 
output for both contract and non-contract producers. A brief 
description of each firm and sampling procedure is given below. 
\ 
The dairy farming activities of the Nestle India Limited3 are 
largely concentrated in the north-western state of Punjab. The firm 
3. Nestle India Limited has a retail network of about 700 thousand outlets in India, 
covering 3300 towns and serviced by over 4000 distributors. Its important value­
added products are baby food, infant milk powder, dairy whiteners, sweetened 
condensed milk, ghee, UHT milk, curd and butter. The firm procured 236 million 
kg milk from over 85000 farmers in 1002 villages in 2001 (Dhaliwal, 2003) . 
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has its milk-processing factory at the town of Moga and sources raw 
milk from the districts of Moga, Ludhiana, Sangrur, Mukatsar, 
Ferozepur and Faridkot. These districts have been collectively 
referred to as 'Moga Milk District'. A random sample of 152 
producers4 supplying milk regularly to Nestle was drawn from 12 
villages of the Moga milk district. Selected villages were located in 
different directions around the factory in Moga within a radius of 
about 70 kilometres. In addition, 22 producers selling milk directly 
to the consumers and to the confectioneries in the nearby towns/ 
cities were identified. The small sample size of non-contract 
producers was due to the fact that an overwhelming majority of the 
commercial dairy farmers were selling milk to Nestle India Limited. 
Venkateshwara Hatcheries LimitedS had started contract broiler 
farming operations during the mid-1990s in some southern and 
western states. The present study is confined to the southern state of 
Andhra Pradesh, which is a leading producer of poultry meat in the 
country. Unlike other agricultural activities, poultry production is 
widely dispersed. Both contract and non-contract producers have a 
wide spatial dispersion. Therefore, a relatively small sample of 25 
contract producers and an equal number of non-contract producers 
was randomly selected from 10 villages in the districts of 
Rangareddy, Mehboobnagar and Nalagonda in Andhra Pradesh. 
The third case study is on the Mother Dairy Fruits and Vegetables 
Limited6 (MDFVL) that integrates fruits and vegetable production 
4 The firm follows a two-fold contractmg arrangement For those havmg milch 
anImals of more than 25, It enters mto a regal contract For small producers, 
the mIlk IS procured through the agents, with whom the firm has a legal 
contract The latter mode dommates 
5 The Venkateshwara Hatchenes (VH) group was establIshed m 1971 as a franchIse 
of Babcook Poultry Farm Inc, USA In 1974, It establIshed 'BalaJi Foods and 
Feeds LImited' for processmg of eggs mto egg powder Its broiler breed 
VENCOBB holds 60 per cent of the IndIan market The firm entered mto contract 
farmmg dunng the mld-1990s It has retaIl cham m major metros also where the 
fresh and frozen chICken and ready-to-cook frozen chIcken are dIrectly sold It also 
exports ready-to-eat chIcken products It has a !lUsmess of about IndIan Rs 1300 
crore from poultry-related products (Source Poultry Lme, 2 (6) 2002) 
6 MDFVL was establIshed m 1988 to meet the growmg demand for fresh frUlts 
and vegetables m DelhI metropolItan area with dIrect procurement from the 
farmers It sells about 250 tonnes of [rUlts and vegetables everyday through Its 279 
retaIl outlets The fresh frUIts and vegetables are procured from 100 producers' 
assoCIatIOns that cover 18000 growers The producers' aSSOCIatIons are mformal 
cooperatIves or self-help groups managed by the producers themselves About 
75,000 customers VISIt ItS retaIl outlets dally (Source http //www saJalmdla com). 
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through a retail chain in Delhi. Its procurement operations extend all 
over the country and are usually governed by the regional niches in 
production of specific commodities. Highly perishable commodities 
are procured from the nearby areas around Delhi. Two producers' 
associations-one in rural Delhi and the other in Sonepat district of 
Haryana (a state bordering Delhi) were identified for selection of 
contract producers. One producers' association covers 2-4 villages and 
has 25 members. Many non-members too supply vegetables regularly 
to MDFVL through the producers' associations. Required information 
was collected from all the members (50) of these two associations. 
In addition, information was collected from 50 randomly selected 
non-members, who were also supplying vegetables to MDFVL and 50 
producers who were selling vegetables in the open market. 
Marketing arrangements developed by these firms are different 
from those in the open market system. Unlike traditional marketing 
arrangements, these firms ensure procurement of contracted produce 
at the doorstep of the producers that enables them to save on 
transport, travel and labour costs. The firms also provide input 
services at wholesale rates and new technologies, which reduce the 
cost of production. 
3. IMPLICATIONS OF INNOVATIVE INSTITUTIONS 
In this section implications of innovative institutions have been 
discussed on (i) profit and transaction costs, (ii) scale of operation, 
and (iii) output prices and risk sharing mechanism. 
Implications on Profit and Transaction Costs 
The key issue was to understand how the selected firms develop 
new institutional arrangements and benefit farmers in promoting 
high-value food commodities? In this section, we have assessed the 
performance of new institutional arrangements in the supply chain of 
the these selected perishable and high-value food commodities.  
Profits obtained and costs incurred by the farmers were regarded as 
indicators of performance for new institutional arrangements. The 
results have manifested striking difference in the profits of contract 
and non-contract farmers for all the commodities under study 
(Figure 14.1). The contract farmers attained substantially higher net 
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profit than the non-contract farmers. Milk contract farmers attained 
double the profie than\ of the non-contract milk farmers. The 
\ 
corresponding profit difference was 78 per cent for vegetable farmers 
and 13 per cent for broiler farmers. Such a high difference in profit 
was attracting farmers to supply their raw material to the firm and 
thus was strengthening linkages in the evolving supply chain. It is 
evident that higher profit is one of the key motivations for the 
farmers to integrate with the firm(s) in supplying raw material (s) . 
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Net Profit of Contract and Non-contract Milk, 
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The advantage that contract farmers had over non-contract 
farmers was mainly due to savings in production and marketing 
costs. And to verify this observation, production and transaction costs 
of milk, vegetables and broilers were estimated for contract and non­
contract farmers. The results in Figure 14.2 clearly indicate that the 
total cost (production + transaction) of these commodities was much 
lower for contract than hen-contract farmers. Details about costs and 
7. Dairy farmers supply cattle'"-nd buffalo milk that differs in fat content. The milk 
from both the sources was CeJ:tverted into four per cent fat corrected milk 
(FCM), following Hemme et a/., (ZOO3 ) .  
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Figure 14.2 
Production and Transaction Cost of Contract and 
Non-contract Farmers for Milk and Vegetables 
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profit of contract farmers for milk, broilers and vegetables are given 
in Appendices A-l4.1, A-l4.2 and A-l4.3, respectively. The costs of 
milk production of contract farmers were less by approximately 21 
per cent in miik and 26 per cent in vegetables than those of non­
contract farmers.The l�w� production costs can be mainly attributed 
to lower transaction costs (Table 14.1). The share of transaction cost 
in total cost for non-contract farmers was 20 per cent for milk and 
,-
21 per cent for vegetables; it was only 2 per cent for contract farmers. 
Such a comparison was, however, not possible in the case of broilers, 
as the firm provided free chicks, feed, and veterinary services to the 
contract farmers. However, the transaction cost was comparable, 
which was 58 per cent less for contract farmers. 
It was obvious that the contract farmers were taking advantage of 
new institutional arrangements that reduced the costs of their travel, 
transport of inputs and produce, access to information and new 
technology. In the case of milk and vegetables, the transaction costs 
were less on contract farms due to savings in time, transportation 
cost and labour cost for marketing of produce. These were mainly 
due to collection of these commodities by the firms from the 
producer 's Village. It may be concludeathat access to market and 
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information about new technology at negligible costs motivate 
farmers to participate in such evolving institutional arrangements. 
Table 14. 1 
Production and Transaction Costs of Milk, Broiler and Vegetable 
Production in Contract and Non-contract Farming (Rs./Tonne) 
Commodity Contract Farming Non-contract Farming 
Production Transaction Total Production Transaction Total 
Cost Cost Cost Cost Cost Cost 
Milk 5586 100 5686 5728 1442 7170 
BroIler' 808 38 846 27322 90 27412 
Vegetable" 1485 35 1520 1630 437 2067 
Note: * For broder, the firm provides free ch icks, feed and medlcmes to the contract 
farmers 
** Refers to spmach 
In the case of broiler, hardly any cost was incurred by contract 
farmers on extension, communication and transportation for 
acquiring inputs. These costs were' as high as 80 per cent of the total 
transaction cost in broiler prodtktion. The principal attraction for the 
broiler farmers for participating in the contractual arrangement was 
the availability of chicks, medicines and feed without any direct 
financial liability on them. These inputs accounted for about 75 per 
cent in the total cost of broiler production and were the critical 
inputs for productivity and profitability. This means that broiler 
contract farmers were enjoying indirect credit for important inputs 
without any interest and, perhapS; that was the main attraction to the 
farmers, particularly smallholders, for establishing strong links with 
the broiler firm. 
Reduction in transaction costs through vertical coordination is 
beneficial to the firm and the farmers mutually. The firm gets an 
assured and timely supply of the desired raw material. It helps the 
firm in having a better control over its operational and fixed costs 
and minimising the risk on account of underutilisation of its 
capacity; thus eventually minimising the cost of processing. It also 
enables the firm to improve its market reputation. On the other side, 
the farmers .get assured market for their produce that is otherwise 
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not possible on a regular basis. Greater access to market improves 
the farmers' capacity to withstand risks arising out of production and 
price fluctuations. Besides, they have a more reliable access to 
production inputs, capital, technology and information. Such a win­
win situation was found to have remarkably increased farmers' 
participation in contract farming in niche areas and commodities; 76 
per cent of vegetable farmers and 56 per cent of broiler farmers had 
expanded their scale of operation between 1990 and 2000. Non­
contract vegetable and broiler farmers also expanded their scale of 
operation but only at a lower level, by 54 and 44 per cent farmers, 
respectively. Such a noticeable expansion by the contract farmers 
revealed that they were- magnificently gaining from the innovative 
arrangements made for production and marketing. 
Scale Effects 
There have been apprehe:gsions that smallholders would not be 
able to take full advantage of the new institutional arrangements 
(Glover, 1987; Watts, 1984; Key and Runsten, 1999). These 
arguments are based on the fears that firms in order to reduce their 
transaction costs (such as distribution of inputs, credit and extension 
services) may be inclined to have a tie-up with a few large farmers 
rather than dealing with a large number of scattered smallholders. 
Another factor that supports contracting with large landholders is 
their better capacity to invest in production-related inputs, technology 
information, and withstand risks. But, the large farmers have a better 
access to market information and strong bargaining power that might 
add to the firm's transaction costs. 
To examine the state of affairs of smallholders8 and their linkages 
with the firms, a disaggregated analysis was carried out based on the 
size of farms for vegetable production and scale of operations for 
milk and broilers. The distribution of smallholders in the sample 
8. For rrulk, smallholders were considered as those who had milk animals up to 5; while 
farmers having milk animals between 6 and 10 were characterised as medium, and 
more than 10, as large farmers. 
For broilers, those had up to 5000 birds per cycle were defined as small farmers, and 
the ones with 5000-10,000 birds as medium, and with more than 10,000 birds, as 
large farmers. 
For vegetables, small farmers were those who had land less than two ha, and those 
having land between two and four ha as medium, and with more than four ha land, 
as large farmers. 
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clearly showed that they were well represented in the contractual 
arrangements in the three case studies (Table 14.2). The doubt that 
the firm may ignore and discriminate against smallholders did not 
have any ground. To take advantage of economies of scale, dairy and 
vegetable firms were contracting through producers' associations 
rather than dealing directly with individual farmers. The milk and 
vegetable firms had organised farmers into groups or cooperative 
associations for activities such as procurement of inputs, technical 
advice, facilitating credit needs, collecting output, etc. Such a 
mechanism has helped the firm in overcoming the difficulties faced 
in approaching too many scattered smallholders individually. It 
eventually could help in controlling escalation in transaction costs. 
Table 14.2 
Distribution of Sample Farmers Associated with Contract Farming 
(Per Cent) 
Commodity Small Medium Large 
Dairy 56 27 17 
Poultry 32 32 36 
Vegetable 37 36 27 
It was well established that contract farmers, irrespective of size 
of the farms, were producing milk, broilers and vegetables at a lower 
cost and were attaining higher profits than the non-contract farmers 
(Figure 14.3; Table 14.3). The smallholders could save approximately 
28 per cent cost in vegetable production and 20 per cent in milk 
production as a result of contract farming. The corresponding savings 
in case of large farmers were 22 per cent and 14 per cent, 
respectively. This reduction in cost was mainly due to lower 
transaction costs (Tables 14.4 and 14.5). Large framers have lower 
transaction costs. The pecuniary cost of production (that excluded 
family labour) of smallholders was however lower than that of large 
farmers. It was observed that by and large the pecuniary costs 
increased with higher scale of business, while non-pecuniary costs 
(mainly family labour) manifested a decline (Table 14.6). 
Smallholders are sufficiently endowed with own-family labour, 
whereas large farmers generally depend on hired labour that needs 
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Figure 14.3 
Net Gain in Profit (%) from 
Contract Farming over Non-contract Farming 
(b) Over Total Cost 
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Table 14.3 
Farm Size-wise Unit Cost of Production and Profit in Milk, 
Broiler and Vegetable of Contract and NOn-contract Producers 
(Rs./Tonne) 
Farm Size Milk Broiler' Vegetable" 
Contract Non-contract Contract Non-contract Contract Non-contract 
Unit Cost of Production (Rs./tonne) 
Small 6266 7797 1022 27692 1522 2127 
Medium 5489 6901 848 27854 1486 1985 
Large 5475 6394 812 27052 1531 1958 
All 5686 7170 846 27412 1520 2067 
Net Profit Over Total Cost (Rs./tonne) 
Small 2446 866 2238 2087 1818 920 
Medium 3745 2081 2273 2058 1809 1122 
Large 4329 3604 2261 1934 1792 1167 
All 3651 1821 2255 2003 1791 1007 
Net Profit Over Pecuniary Cost (Rs./tonne) 
Small 4170 3229 2708 2328 2309 1532 
Medium 4622 3881 2308 2136 2287 1659 
Large 4892 4932 2266 1972 2215 1628 
All 4606 3720 2318 2107 2267 1585 
Net Profit Over Total Cost (%) 
Small 39.04 11.11 218.98 7.54 119.45 43.25 
-
Medium 68.23 30.16 268.04 7.39 121.74 56.52 
Large 79.07 56.37 278.45 7.15 117.05 59.60 
All 64.21 25.40 266.55 7.31 117.87 48.72 
Note: * In the case of broilers, the unit cost of production of contract producers 
is low because it does not include the cost of chick, feed and medicine, 
which are supplied by the firm free of cost. 
•• Refers to spinach . 
Table 14.4 
Share of Transaction Cost in Total Cost of Milk and Vegetable 
Production and Marketing under Different Farm-sizes 
(Per Cent) 
Farm-size Contract Farmers Non-contract Farmers 
Milk Vegetables Milk Vegetable 
Small 3.27 2.23 24.50 23.84 
Medium 1.51 0.54 17.62 17.48 
Large 1.17 3.00 14.72 13.94 
All 1.76 2.30 20.11 21.14 
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to be effectively monitored, adding to their production cost. That was 
why large farmers preferred to select labour-saving production 
portfolio unless  cheap and timely labour was available. It was 
corroborated clearly by the vegetable case study, wherein a marked 
difference was observed in area allocated to vegetables by small and 
large farmers.  The smallholders allocated 57 p er cent area to 
vegetables as compared to 34 per cent by the large farmers. 
Table 14.5 
Transaction Cost of Different Farm Sizes for 
Broilers' Production and Marketing 
(Rs./Tonne) 
Farm-size Contract Non-contract Difference (%) 
Small 59 142 58.5 
Medium 37 81 54.3 
Large 34 65 47.7 
All farmers 38 90 57.8 
Table 14.6 
Pecuniary and Non-pecuniary Costs of Production and Marketing of Milk, 
Broilers and Vegetables in Different Farm-size of Contract Producers 
(Rs./Tonne) 
Farm-size Milk Broiler' Vegetable" 
Pecuniary Cost 
Small 4542 552 1031 
Medium 4612 813 1008 
Large 4912 807 1078 
All 4731 783 1044 
Non-Pecuniary Cost 
Small 1724 470 491 
Medium 877 35 478 
Large 563 5 501 
All 955 63 476 
Note: • Cost of chicks, feed and medicines is not included as the firm supplies 
these inputs without any charges . 
• * Refers to spinach. 
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These facts revealed that smallholders were neither being 
deprived of their participation in contract farming nor were being 
exploited by the firms .  The smallholders could minimise their 
transaction costs and increase their income by participating in contract 
farming. The savings in transaction cost were mainly on account of 
marketing their small produce through contract farming. As regard 
production, smallholders had the comparative advantage of utilising 
their own-family labour, while for marketing their produce, they were 
taking advantage of the firm, which ensured procurement of 
perishable commodities at remunerative prices . Contrary to the 
argument favouring contracting of firms with large farmers, it was 
observed that the firms were finding it more convenient and 
beneficial to contract with smallholders and their associations. There 
were four obvious reasons for it: (i) less effect on overall supply in 
the event of crop failure of one or few farmers (idiosyncratic risk); 
(ii) more flexible production portfolio of smallholders, which would 
help in quickly responding to consumers' changing preferences; 
(iii) smallholders could ensure better quality as they strictly comply 
with the production practices advised by the firm; and (iv) low 
marketable surplus of smallholders increases their dependency on 
the firm for profit maximisation. 
Implications on Prices and Risk Sharing 
There have been apprehensions that the contract farming would 
ultimately lead to monopsonic situation and could exploit farmers 
(Glover, 1987; Little and Watts, 1994). Such a situation arises when 
the market is not competitive and one of the trading partners acts 
opportunistically to exploit the farmers. To verify this phenomenon, 
we compared the prices offered to contract farmers with those in the 
prevailing market. We observed that the contract farmers were being 
offered relatively higher prices than the prevailing market prices. In 
case of vegetables, the contract farmers received 8 per cent higher 
prices, mainly for a better quality and as an incentive for ensuring a 
regular supply. In case of vegetables, the prices offered to the farmers 
were determined by the prevailing prices in the Delhi Fruits & 
Vegetables Market (one of the largest trading markets for fruits & 
vegetables in India) with a premium of 5-20 per cent above this 
benchmark price, depending upon commodity and quality. In case of 
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milk, the prices were determined on the basis of SNF and fat content. 
Since the milk market is  highly competitive, there was only a 
marginal price premium (4 per cent) for the contract farmers over 
the prevailing market prices. In the case of broilers, the prices were 
fixed by BROMARK.9 Nevertheless, the firm shared additional profits 
due to rise in market prices with the farmers. Also, the firm offered 
an incentive of 25 per cent for a better feed-conversion ratio. In all 
these case studies, we did not observe any kind of monopsonic 
behavior to exploit farmers. Also, the existence of perfect competition 
in th ese markets did not allow any of th ese firm s to trade in 
exceptionally large volumes and control the market. 
Sharing of risk between the producer and firm is  another 
advantage in the case of broiler industry. The firm bears full market 
risks. It is important because broiler prices are often faced with high 
price-volatility that affects profit considerably. Both the parties share 
the production risk depending on its nature and magnitude. The 
mortality risk up to 5 per cent of the chicks is considered to be 
natural and is borne by the firm. For mortality exceeding 5 per cent, 
the firm charges Re. O.lO/kg of live body weight of the grown-up 
broiler for every one per cent increase in the mortality. Such a risk­
sharing mechanism provides protection to the producers, particularly 
the smallholders, under volatile market conditions. 
The implications of risk-sharing mechanism on profit and yield 
of contract and non-contract farmers were examined by computing 
the Coefficient of Variation (CV) in different cycles. The striking 
differences in CV of profits between contract and non-contract 
farmers are evident from Table 14.7. Whereas the CV of profit of 
contract farmers was almost stable over different cycles, it was very 
high with sharp fluctuations for non-contract farmers. Since there 
was not much difference in CV of yield between contract and non­
contract farmers, the price volatility in case of broilers ,was the only 
reason for high variability in profits. It can also be seen that the CV 
of yield was higher for non-contract farmers during March-April and 
May-June periods. This was because of higher temperature during 
these periods, which had resulted in high mortality rate. Ramaswami 
et a/., (2004) have estimated that contracting in broiler industry 
9. BROMARK IS an apex organisation of different stakeholders in broiler production. 
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could shift about 88 per cent of risk from the farmer to the 
processor. Such a risk-sharing mechanism helps contract farmers, 
particularly the smallholders in improving their management 
strategies and minimising production and price risks. Experiences in 
the past have revealed that high risk in production and prices had led 
to the closure of several poultry farms. Alternatively, poultry farmers 
were gradually shifting to contract farming. No analogous risk-sharing 
mechanism was found in case of milk and vegetable production. 
Table 14.7 
Cycle-wise Coefficient of Variation (CV) in Yield and Profit of 
Broiler in Contract and Non-contract Farmings 
(Per Cent) 
Production Cycle* cv·· of Broiler Yield cv** of Net Profit 
Contract Non-contract Contract Non-contract 
Farmers Farmers Farmers Farmers 
January-February 10 8 22 65 
March-April 8 16 20 137 
May-June 5 22 22 296 
July-August 20 21 20 270 
September-October 9 7 26 107 
November-December 8 7 26 49 
Note: * One cycle completes in 38 days from one-day old chick to fully matured 
for meat. 
** CV of broiler yield and net profit for each cycle is over different farms. 
The study clearly showed that the speculation of monopsonic 
behavior by the firm did not exist. On the contrary, farmers were 
enjoying benefits of assured procurement of their produce and higher 
-prices, even though prices could be higher marginally. Generally, in 
the absence of assured prices, farmers opted for low risk crops. 
Empirical evidence suggested that farmers were averse to risk and 
even were ready to pay a premium (lower product prices) for 
guaranteed income schemes (Binswanger, 1980; Hazell, 1982). In our 
case studies, assured prices and market access were encouraging 
farmers to diversify agriculture towards high-value and perishable 
commodities. Such a mechanism, which insures the farmer against 
price risk, benefits the firm also in terms of assured supply and 
better quality of raw material. 
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4. DETERMINANTS OF FARMERS' PARTICIPATION 
A number of socio-economic factors influence producers' decision 
to participate in contract farming. A clear understanding of these 
factors helps in upscaling of the contract farming model for 
promoting high-value food commodities. Logit model was used to 
identify those characteristics that influence producers' participation in 
contract farming. The model takes participation as a binary 
dependent variable with a value 'I' for the participants, 'zero' 
otherwise. The structural form of the model is given in Equation (1); 
C, = °1 + °2 Z, + Il, . . .  (1) 
where, Cj is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the farmer 
participates in the contract programme, and 0 otherwi se. Z, is a 
vector of independent variables, and includes factors like schooling, 
and age of farmer, labour availability, ownership of assets, 
experience in particular commodity, etc.; °1 and °2 are the estimated 
parameters, while Il, is the error-term. The selected variables in the 
model are described below. 
It was hypothesised that availability of family labour, non-farm 
income, smallholdings and higher education and age of th e 
household would have a positive effect on the decision to participate 
in contractual arrangements. It was expected that households with 
greater surplus labour were more likely to join contract farming 
schemes because of labour-intensive nature of the commodities 
contracted. Producers having income from non-farm sources were 
also more likely to participate in contract schemes due to lesser 
experience in farming and/or want of time for marketing. On asset 
specificity, it was considered that greater the asset specificity, higher 
would be the probability of participation in the contracting farming. 
Further, on the basis of experience in commercial farming it was 
hypothesised that the less experienced producers would participate 
more eagerly in the contract farming. Similarly, a person' with higher 
education level was expected to have a better access to information 
and more clarity about emerging institutions. An older person being 
less mobile was expected to participate much 'more in schemes that 
made marketing available at his doorsteps. The definitions and 
hypothesised values of the socio-economic variables included in the 
model are outlined in Appendix A-14.4. 
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T�e results of the logit model are reported in Table 14.8. By and 
large, the income from non-farm sources and experience in particular 
production activity were influencing producers' decision to participate 
in contract farming. Other variables included in the model were non­
significant. It was interesting to note that income from non-farm 
sources had a positive and significant influence on producers' 
participation in the case of milk and vegetable contract farming. It 
was obvious that greater focus on non-farm activities and scarcity of 
time compelled the producers to participate in those institutions that 
could facilitate acquiring inputs and disposing of outputs. Contract 
farming offers such opportunities and therefore, encourages those 
who are engaged mostly in non-farm production activities. 
Table 14.8 
Factors Influencing Participation in Contract Farming in Milk, 
Broilers and Vegetable Production: Results of Logit Function 
I 
Variable Milk Broiler Vegetable 
Age - 0.0247 0. 0410 0.0047 
( 0.0251) ( 0.0429) ( 0.D l 74) 
Schooling - 0. 0759 0. 0518 0.0025 
( 0.0640) ( 0.1218) ( 0.0454) 
Experience 0.0811" - 0.3598" 0.0813' " 
( 0.0370) ( 0.1111) ( 0.0319) 
Land Size 0. 1937 - 0. 1886 0.0608 
( 0. 1226) (0. 1544) ( 0.0807) 
Total Stock 0.0381 - 0.00001 
( 0.0599) ( 0. 00005) 
Non-farm Income 1.6835** - 0. 2256 0. 7678* 
( 0.6747) ( 1. 5352) (0.4593) 
Labour Availability 0.7128 - 0.2005 0. 1264 
(0.3605) (0.1 518) (0. 0898) 
Constant 0.0089 2.0974 - 1.9218** 
( 1.4173) (2.7558) ( 0.9589) 
Chi-square 23.0731 " *  20.2485** ' 19.2960* " 
Number of Observations 176 50 132 
Note: " ' , ** and * denote significances at 1, 5 and 10 per cent probability levels, 
respectively. 
Figures within the parentheses are standard errors. 
Producers' experience in different activities yielded mixed results. 
W hile experiences of milk and vegetable producers had a positive 
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Impact on participation in contract farming, broiler producers were 
found to have gradually withdrawn from contract farming with more 
experience. It was because the processes of acquiring inputs and 
disposal of output were observed to be almost similar for contract 
and non-contract broiler farming. The key inputs (chicks, feed and 
medicines) were being delivered at the farm and output was being 
lifted ftom the farm, irrespective of contractual arrangements. Under 
such arrangements, contract as well as non-contract broiler producers 
could save on transportation and marketing costs. Therefore, broiler 
producers, after acquiring some experience in production and 
marketing, gradually withdrew from contract farming to trade 
independently in the open market. On the contrary, milk and 
vegetable producers who opted out from contractual arrangement 
had no such advantage. The transaction costs for milk and vegetables 
non-contract producers escalate as their volume of marketable 
surplus is too small. It has already been discussed earlier that the 
transaction costs for milk and vegetable contract producers are 
significantly lower than for non-contract producers. 
An attempt was also made to predict the shifting of non-contract 
producers to the contract mode and vice-versa. The actual and 
predicted frequencies revealed that given the opportunity an 
overwhelming majority of the non-contract milk producers (86 per 
cent) and vegetable producers (65 per cent) would switch over to 
contract mode of production. But in the case of broiler farming, only 
24 per cent of the non-contract producers would opt for contract 
farming. The probability of change from contract to independent 
production was extremely low in case of dairy and ' vegetable 
production and high in broiler farming. The basis for such a shift has 
been explained earlier, viz. 'contract producers learn rules of the 
game with experience and opt out for independent production'. 
5.  POLICY CONSTRAINTS IN 
EXPANDING VERTICAL COORDINATION 
The study has dearly revealed that strengthening farm-firm 
linkages through new institutional arrangements is mutually 
benefIcial for both producers and firm s.  Despite substantial 
reduction in transaction costs and improvement in marketing 
efficiency, such farm-firm linkage models replicate at a very slow 
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rate_ Among others, there are many pollcy and infrastructural 
obstacles in evolving new institutional arrangements_ After 
discussions with the representatives of the firm, the important ones 
are enumerated below: 
• High-value food commodities require an infrastructure that 
is quite different from that of cereals and pulses_ Most of the 
high-value food commodities being perishable in nature 
require refrigerated transportation and cold storages at 
every stage of value-addition. These are, however, woefully 
lacking and hence, there are substantial post-harvest losses_ 
• One important requirement for successful coordination of 
value-addition and agro-processing is a regular supply of 
good quality raw material from farm to firm_ This can be 
achieved through either self-production by the firm or 
contract farming_ The existing Land Ceiling Act restricts the 
first option, while the latter is not possible unless the 
government enacts appropriate legislation. As on date, none 
of the options has a legal standing; which is a 
discouragement to contract farming. Apart from this, no 
legislation exists for a breach of contract by any party 
(farmer or firm) _ 
• In many states, the by-laws of the market committee 
legislation restrict the sale within a specified area_ Market 
fee including commission charges are high; ranging from 2 
to 7 per cent_ Some states also impose developmental 
charges. Transfer of goods outside the defined geographical 
boundaries attracts imposition of sales tax, octroi, etc Such 
restrictions distort the market, reduce its efficiency and 
discourage formation of farm-firm linkages through contract 
farming. 
• Promotion of agro-processing industry may provide a fillip 
to contract farming of high-value food commodities_ 
However, this sector is afflicted with various ailments like 
(i) scale of industry, (ii) over bureaucratisation and 
complicated legal wrangles, and (iii) high taxes_ Scale of 
industry and its operation affect .the production efficiency of 
processing firms_ Until recently a number of food products 
were reserved for Small-Scale Industries (SSIs) , which often 
428 Agricultural Diversification and Smallholders in South Asia 
lack capital, use obsolete technology, are inefficient in 
production and weak in marketing, and do not have any 
incentive to develop effective farm-firm linkages for 
reducing their transaction costs. Realising the importance of 
scale of industry in agro-processing, the Government of 
India has recently taken-off some of the food items reserved 
for SSIs. In a competitive environment it would have been 
difficult for the SSIs to take advantage of the new 
technologies and economies of scale in production and 
marketing, in both domestic and international markets. 
• Existing bureaucratic and cumbersome procedures 
discourage the potential agro-processors to venture into this 
promising business. There are about 17 laws governing the 
food industry. There are laws that govern a specific 
/ 
commodity or a group of commodities. And, there are 
separate laws relating to weights and measurements, 
packaging, adulteration, etc. These laws are administered 
and implemented by different departments and/or 
ministries of the government. As for instance, Prevention of 
Food Adulteration Act, 1954 is implemented by the 
Ministry of Health; Agriculture Produce (Grading and 
Marking) Act by the Ministry of Rural Development; laws 
related to standards, weights and measurements are under 
the jurisdiction of Ministry of Civil Supplies, Consumer 
Affairs and Public Distribution and the laws related to 
environment are implemented by the Ministry of 
Environment and Forests. For setting up an agro-processing 
unit, an investor has to get clearance from all the concerned 
departments. Such a multiplicity often results in conflicting 
approaches, lack of coordination and administrative delays. 
• Despite fiscal reforms, excise duty and sales tax imposed on 
processed foods continue to remain high. At present, 
processed food items attract an excise duty of 8 per cent of 
the retail price. If all other levies are added to it, the figure 
increases up to 17 per cent. This pushes-up the market 
prices of processed food items, which would be naturally 
much higher than of the fresh food. 
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• Rising demand for food and non-food processed products 
has provided expanding opportunities for the growth of 
their organised retailing that hitherto had comprised only 
about 2 per cent of the total retail sales in India. This has 
attracted so.me large domestic business groups such as Tatas 
(Westside) , RPG (FoodWorld) , Rahejas (Shopper's Stop) and 
Piramal (Pyramids and Crossroads) into food retail trade. 
Some of these retail food chains are sourcing raw materials 
directly from the farmers through vertical coordination 
(Chengappa et aI . ,  2003). The organised retailing is 
concentrated mainly in the southern metropolis cities. That 
is why a silent revolution of innovative institutions is so 
evidently visible in the southern states of India. The 
organised retailing should be encouraged to improve 
marketing-efficiency and profit-sharing with producers and 
consumers. 
The Government of India has undertaken I several steps to 
overcome some of the constraints in agricultural marketing and agro­
processing sector, particularly after the regulatory and fiscal reforms 
have been introduced to attract private investment in food industry. 
Among others, a series of economic reform programmes were started 
in 1991. These include: (i) doing away with the industrial licensing 
requirement for most of the food items, (ii) automatic approval of 
investment up to 51 per cent foreign equity or 100 per cent for non­
resident Indians, (iii) relaxation in monopoly and foreign exchange 
acts, (iv) free import and export of food items (except items on the 
negative list) and capital goods, and (v) permission to financial 
institutions to finance contract farming schemes for strengthening 
backward linkages. The fiscal incentives include: (i) reduction in 
import and excise duties and corporate taxes, and repatriation of 
benefits, (ii) establishment of free trade, and export processing 
I 
zones, (iii) reduction in custom duty on imports of capital goods, 
and exemption from corporate and minimum alternative taxes to the 
firms located in free trade and export processing zones. 
The Government of India has recently initiated a scheme to 
strengthen farm-firm linkages in which reimbursment up to 10 per 
cent of the total purchase by the processor is allowed, limited to 
Rs. 1 million a year. The assistance is also provided for the market 
430 Agricultural Diversification and Smallholders in South Asia 
survey and brand promotion up to 50 per cent of the cost of 
campaign, limited to Rs. 5 million. These measures are slowly 
attracting the organised sector to participate in strengthening of farm­
firm linkages and evolving different innovative institutional models. 
Agriculture being a state subject in India, some state governments 
too have taken initiatives to facilitate/encourage entry of the private/ 
corporate sector to it. As for example, Tamil Nadu has come out with 
a policy document on contract farming. Industries promoting 
cultivation of fruits and vegetables through value-addition have been 
exempted from Land Ceiling Act. In addition, provisions have been 
made to lease degraded forestlands and wastelands to the private 
sector for cultivation of plantation crops with state as a partner. 
Under the policy, the state provides a capital subsidy up to 20 per 
cent of the fixed assets (green house structures, irrigation and 
fertiliser equipmenrs, cold room, tissue culture, etc.) subject to a 
ceiling of Rs. 2 million to fruit and vegetable industries. The fruit 
and vegetable industry has been given the status of an industry, 
enabling it to get preferential treatment in power supply. Punjab has 
also aggressively launched contract farming to replace the existing 
rice-wheat system. In some other states including Madhya Pradesh, 
Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh, incentives and other mechanisms to 
attract private investment in agriculture through contract farming 
have been worked out. Market fee (2-5 per cent) has been exempted 
in these states for producers who sell their produce directly to the 
processors. Consequently, some well-known agro-processing players 
like Hindustan Lever Limited, Nestle India Limited, Britannia 
Industries, Pepsi Co., Rallis India Limited, Escorts, Mahindra & 
Mahindra, and Venkateshwara Hatcheries have started adopting 
'institutional structures' as a means of sourcing raw materials directly 
from the farmers. 
It may be concluded that the present policy envir�nment and 
infrastructure network are inadequate for promoting vertical 
coordination and encouraging the agro -processing sector. The 
scattered attempts made in this direction are showing promising 
results and these need to be replicated in niche areas. It appears that 
the private sector is keen to invest in the agriculture and agro­
processing sector to harness the huge untapped potential, the existing 
policies are discouraging it from venturing into these areas. It is high 
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time the private sector is encouraged to evolve new institutional 
arrangements to take advantage of the opportunities emerging from 
the trade liberalisation. The government should ensure that 
smallholders were not left behind in sharing the benefits of the 
emerging opportunities. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
We have examined the institutional mechanisms adopted by 
different firms to integrate small producers of milk, broilers and 
vegetables in the supply chain and their effects on producers' 
transaction costs and farm profitability. The institutions under the 
study have covered contracting with farmers in case of milk and 
broilers and producers' associations in case of vegetables. The 
models adopted in the three case studies have shown certain 
similarities and some dissimilarities in their approach as well as 
terms and conditions. A common feature is that they provide technical 
support for production and ensure an assured market to the 
producers. Dissimilarities too are many. In broiler farming, the firm 
contributes in terms of major inputs and exercises considerable 
control over the production process, whereas in the case of dairying 
and vegetable production, the firm hardly has any influence on 
producers' decisions. Further, in contract broiler farming, the firm 
pays fixed growing charges thus protecting producers from the price 
risks, whereas in the case of dairying and vegetable production, the 
entire price risk is borne by the producers. 
Nevertheless, the effect of these institutional arrangements on 
producers' transaction costs and farm profitability has been found 
enormous. Transaction costs as a result of contract farming has been 
reduced by over 90 per cent in the case of milk and vegetables and 
58 per cent in the case of broilers. The net revenue realisation by 
contract producers has been 2 to 4-times higher in milk and 
vegetables and l . l -times in broilers. It is observed that smallholders 
are benefited most from such arrangements as their marketable 
surpluses are low and marketing costs are extremely high. 
The criticism against contract farming schemes for their bias 
against small producers has not been found true. Evidence from the 
case studies has indicated considerable involvement of smallholders 
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in such schemes.  We have also examined the criticism against 
contracting firms on their tendency to extract monopsonistic rent in 
the output market. This too has not been supported by the results of 
this study; rather the contract farmers have been found receiving 
relatively higher prices than the non-contract farmers. Many contract 
farming schemes have in-built provision of credits to small 
producers to ease their capital constraints and some critics argue that 
by doing so the firm may make producers excessively dependent on 
it for credit and thus keep them in perpetual indebtedness (Watts, 
1994; Runsten and Key, 1996) . In the case studies, we have not come 
across such type of perpetual indebtness as a result of contract 
farming. 
Based on the empirical analysis of three models of vertical 
coordination, the study suggests the following future policy 
directions: 
• By linking production with marketing the firms contribute in 
developing markets for high-value food commodities, which 
hitherto are thin, fragmented and thus exploitative. Contrary 
to the general perception, the smallholders gain substantially 
as a result of new institutional arrangements. Therefore, any 
effort for promoting vertical coordination in high-value 
food commodities would not only augment income of 
smallholders but would also generate employment 
opportunities in the rural areas. 
• Many institutions provide free extension and support 
services to the producers as part of the contract. The public 
extension system has been under criticism for its 
inefficiency in delivery of services and rising burden on 
public exchequer (Ahuja et al. , 2000; Sulaiman and Sadamate, 
2000), and the governments are, in fact, looking out for 
alternative cost-effective extension models. Institutions such 
as contract farming and cooperatives can be considered as 
models in facilitating the process of privatisation of public 
extension services at no cost to the public exchequer. 
• Many firms have started undertaking agricultural research, 
which was limited so far, to achieve the desired attributes of 
raw material and acquire competitive edge. These 
developments of agri-business activities could improve the 
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interface between private and public sectoe eesearch, and is 
a welcome augury. 
• Many contracting firms arrange for credit and insurance (in 
terms of risk sharing) for producers. It is in the interest of 
the firm also.  Nevertheless, in poor economies where 
markets for these products are stilI underdeveloped and 
imperfect, such schemes have the potential to ease capital 
constraint on the public exchequer and provide protection 
against risk and uncertainty. 
• Foe many firms the vertical coordin�tion is a means of 
sustaining/improving their export earnings through 
continuous improvements in value-addition at every stage. 
In this pursuit, these firms educate producers also about the 
quality aspects such as Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary (SPS) 
issues that are becoming important in the international 
trade. 
• In countries like India where the existing infrastructure for 
ageo-processing is inadequate, but demand for processed 
food is increasing, multiplier effect of institutional and 
infrastructure development in terms of income and 
employment generation in the primary, secondary and 
tertiary sectors would be enormous. 
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Appendix A- l4. 1 
Production and Transaction Costs of and Net Profit from Milk 
under Contract and Non-contract Farming Mode 
Item Contract Non-contract Difference t-statistics 
(Per Cent) 
Number of in-milk Bovines 7.3 5 . 3  37.7 2.067* *  
Milk Yield (Kg/in-Milk Animal) 11.9 11.4 4.4 0.95 5 
Marketed Surplus (%) 84 .9 83.0 1.9 0. 722 
Cost of Production (Rs./Tonne) 
Pecuniary 4694 4535 3.5 0.668 
Non-pecuniary 892 1193 - 25 .2 2.027* *  
Total 5 5 86 5 72 8  - 2.5 0.449 
Transaction Cost (Rs./Tonne) 
Pecuniary 37 736 -95.0 10. 734 " * 
Non-pecuniary 63 706 -91.1 5 .867" * 
Total 100 1442 -93.1 7.876' " 
Total Cost (Rs./Tonne) 
Pecuniary 4 731 5 271 - 10_2 2.25 8* *  
Non-pecuniary 95 5 1899 -49. 7 4.692' " 
Total 5 686 71 70 -20.7 4.182* " 
Milk Price (Rs./Tonne) 9337 8991 3. 8 1.165 
Net Profit (Rs./Tonne) 
Over Pecuniary Cost 4606 3720 23.8 2. 129* '  
Over Total Cost 365 1 1821 100_5 3.415 ' "  
Note: " ', • •  and ' indicate significances at 1,  5 and 10 per cent levels respectively. 
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App endix A-14.2 
Production and Transaction Costs and Net Benefits from Broilers 
under Contract and Non-contract Farming 
Item Contract Non-contract Difference t -statistics 
(Per Cent) 
Number of Producer Households 25 25 
Number of Chicks Placed Per Crop (Cycle) 8149 6891 18.3 0.746 
Number of Production Cycles/Year 5.6 5.8 -2.8 0.879 
Mean Length of the Production Cycle (Days) 42.3 48.4 -12.6 7.106*** 
Mortality Rate (Per Cent) 4.8 4.4 8.7 0.737 
Body Weight (KglBird) 1.78 1.79 -0.6 0.128 
Feed Conversion Rate 
(Kg FeedlKg Body Weight) 1.9 2.2 -14.3 3.186*** 
Marketed Surplus (Per Cent) 100.0 99.9 
Cost of Production (Rs.lTonne Body Weight) 
Pecuniary 746 27227 
Non-pecuniary 62 95 
Total 808 27322 
Transaction Costs (Rs.lTonne Body Weight) 
Pecuniary 37 81 -54.3 2.939*** 
Non-pecuniary 1 9 -88.9 
Toral 38 90 -57.8. 3.146" * 
Total Costs (Rs.lTonne Body Weight) 
Pecuniary 783 27308 
Non-pecuniary 63 104 
Total COSt 846 27412 
Gross Profit (Rs./Tonne Body Weight) 3101 29415 
Fixed GrOwing Charges/Sale of Broilers 2500 28792 
Net lncentive!Penalty 79 0 
Total from Broilers 2579 28792 
Sale of Poultry Manure 372 434 
Sale of Empty Feed Bags 150 189 
Net Profit from Broilers (Rs.lTonne Body Weight) 
Over Pecuniary Costs 1796 1484 21.p 1.272 
Over Total Costs 1733 1380 25.6 1.437 
Net Profit from All (Rs.lTonne Body Weight) 
Over Pecuniary Costs 2318 2107 10.0 0.922 
Over Total Costs 2255 2003 12.6 1.107 
Note: " ', •• and • mdicate significances at 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels, respectively. 
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Appendix A-14.3 
Production and Transaction Costs and Net Profit from Vegetables 
(Spinach) under Contract and Non-contract Farming 
Item Contract Non-contract Difference t-statistics 
(Per Cent) 
Crop yield (Tonne/Ha) 8 . 6  8 . 3  4.0 0.954 
Cost of Production (Rs./Tonne) 
Pecuniary 1 020 1 1 71 - 1 2.9 2.063 '*  
Non-pecuniary 465 459 1 . 3  0.266 
Total 1485 1630 -8.9 1 . 588 
Transaction Cost (Rs./Tonne) 
Pecuniary 24 3 1 8  -92.5 6 . 5 8 3*" 
Non-pecuniary 1 1  1 1 9  -90.8 5 . 3 5 6'" 
Total 3 5  437 -92.0 6.637***  
Total Cost: Production (Rs./Tonne) 
Pecuniary 1044 1489 -29 .8  5.606***  
Non-pecuniary 476 578 -17.5 2 . 846'" 
Total 1 520 2067 -2 6.5 5 . 663 '" 
Price (Rs./Tonne) 3 3 1 1  3074 7.7 2.303 ** 
Net Profit (Rs./Tonne) 
Over Pecuniary Costs 2267 1 5 8 6  42.9 4.453 ***  
Over Total Cost 1 79 1  1007 77.9 4.727**'  
Note: " ', • •  and • indicate significances at 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels, respectively. 
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Appe ndix A- 14.4 
Selected Characteristics of Contract and Non-contract Producers 
Variable Definition Hypothesis 
Age of the Household Age in years of the household 
makes decision + 
Schooling of the Schooling years of the household 
Household makes decision + 
Experience in Experience in years of producing 
Particular Activity particular commodity +/-
Land Size Size of landholding in ha 
Total Stock Number of livestock or size of 
broiler shed + 
Non-farm Income Yes if there is any non-farm income, 
otherwise zero + 
Labour Availabe with Adult workers available for agriculture 
the Household in the household + 
